Introduction
Freedom of choice is associated with the availability of choice (Banja, 2015; Catania, 1975; Monroe et al., 2014) . It has been suggested that having options available to us is inherently rewarding because it fosters a sense of control, by allowing us to choose the option we believe to be optimal (Leotti and Delgado, 2011; Leotti et al., 2010; Ryan and Deci, 2006) . Others have proposed that individuals seek to keep a number of options open in order to maintain a state where they foresee greater potential to influence their environment (Friston et al., 2015; Klyubin et al., 2005) . Previous findings suggest that neural representations of an upcoming choice reflect the number of options under consideration, where free choices are associated with more flexible preparation of multiple options Salvaris and Haggard, 2014) . The availability and encoding of options may therefore influence the perceived freedom of a choice while individuals prepare to make decisions.
Freedom of choice is commonly considered to depend on the availability of options from which to choose and to be diminished by external constraints that limit choice (Monroe and Malle, 2010) . This implies that an individual's experience of volition is innately tied to perception of their possibilities in the external world. Computational theories propose that in dynamic environments individuals maintain an internal model of the environment that represents the potential actions that they can take at any one time (Klyubin et al., 2005 (Klyubin et al., , 2008 . This predicts that an individual is driven to be in a state of 'empowerment', where one believes that multiple differing future states could be attained through their actions (Klyubin et al., 2005 (Klyubin et al., , 2008 . The belief that an individual can reach these future states may be supported by maintaining multiple action representations online during the process of preparing an upcoming decision (Cisek, 2006; .
In action selection tasks, it has been found that neural representations of all available options are initially activated and neural activity for the chosen option increases over time leading to a decision, concurrent with a decrease in activity for the non-chosen option (Cisek, 2006; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) . Studies suggest that individuals continue to consider available options throughout the time leading to a decision when given the freedom to choose, in contrast to when they are instructed (Rens et al. under review) (Fleming et al., 2009) . Further, evidence suggests that freely chosen actions are less strongly encoded in the preparatory decision period than instructed actions and, in turn, more flexibly updated in response to environmental cues (Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris and Haggard, 2014) . This raises the possibility that free decisions are associated with a state in which the alternative, unselected options remain actively encoded Fleming et al., 2009) .
Investigating the perceived freedom of choice provides the opportunity to identify where free choices, and their associated subjective experience, arise in the brain . This approach was spearheaded by , who studied the subjective experience of free choice in a task requiring participants to freely generate a number in a random sequence. These authors found that participants rated choices as less free if there were fewer perceived options available . However, the relationship between the availability of options and the brain regions that differed in activity according to subjective ratings was not directly investigated. We reasoned that if the awareness of the options in the environment contributes to the sense of freedom individuals feel in their upcoming choices, the subjective experience of freedom may be related to the neural representation of an upcoming choice.
In order to investigate whether perceived freedom of choice is related to neural encoding of available options, we designed a decision-making task in a virtual environment that participants performed during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). At the start of each trial, participants were asked to freely choose between left and right doors that were situated at the end of a corridor. After making their choices, participants advanced up the corridor to a halfway point, where lock cues indicated whether one or both doors remained open. If both doors were open, participants were free to either continue with their original choice or switch to the other door; if one door was locked, participants were required to select the remaining open door. This resulted in some trials in which participants were forced to switch, but crucially also trials in which participants could continue with their initial choice, but the alternative option was removed. Participants rated how free they felt their choice to be at the end of each trial. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), this design allowed us to examine the neural encoding of choices prior to door selection and, more importantly, to predict the availability of an alternative option. Specifically, in cases where participants continued with their initial choice, we examined differences in neural representation when the alternative door was available compared to when it was not. We then examined the relationship between the decoding of options and participants' perceived freedom of choice. We hypothesised that trials in which both doors remained open would be rated as freer than trials where one door was locked, even when participants could continue with their initial choice, and that the perceived freedom of choice would correspond to neural representations of the availability of an alternative option.
Materials and methods

Participants
Twenty-five participants were recruited after providing written informed consent. All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, and no history of psychiatric disease, neurological trauma or disorder. One participant was excluded for not following the task instructions, and data from the remaining 24 participants were used for the behavioural analyses (15 female, mean age 24 years, range 20-32 years). Participants were monetarily compensated for their time. The University of Queensland Medical Research Ethics Committee approved the experiment.
Experimental task
Participants underwent a brief training session with instructions outside the scanner prior to completing the experimental task in a 3T MRI scanner. The task was based in a virtual environment, presented using Psychtoolbox on MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The paradigm is shown in Fig. 1 . The task environment consisted of a corridor with two doors at the end that participants needed to advance towards to select. Participants viewed a first-person perspective of the threedimensional corridor from their current position, which updated continuously as they moved. At the start of the trial, a message to 'Choose now' appeared, asking participants to choose freely at this time between the left and right doors. They subsequently advanced up the corridor by holding down a button with the left index finger. At the halfway point, left and right lock cues appeared for 0.8s. If both locks were displayed as open, both doors were available and participants were permitted to either stay with their initial choice (Choice Stay) or to change their mind and select the other door (Choice Switch). If one of the locks was closed while the other one was open, participants could only select whichever door remained unlocked. According to the door the participants had initially chosen, this was either congruent with their initial choice (No Choice Stay) or it forced them to change their selection to the other door (No Choice Switch). In summary, while each trial always started out with a free choice, the experimental manipulation at halfway point resulted in four conditions, which differed in a) Choice Availability, i.e. whether the alternative door was still available, and b) Choice Response, i.e. whether a stay or switch decision occurred.
The distance of the corridor from the start to halfway and from halfway to doors was equivalent to approximately 4s for each section, with small variation introduced by participant key presses. Participants acted on their decision as they reached the doors by using the right index or middle finger for left and right doors, respectively. A star appeared after selection of any available door as a token reward. If participants chose a locked door, a red cross appeared and the trial was recorded as an error. Catch trials occurred periodically (6 trials per block) in which a stop sign cue was presented shortly after participants started to move up the corridor. Participants had a brief time window of 1s to input which door they were planning to choose. These trials were designed to ensure that participants remained attentive and followed instructions to choose a door at the start of each corridor. Longer response times were interpreted as a failure of having formed an initial choice, and an error resulted.
Following each trial, participants provided a rating of their perceived level of freedom on a free-sliding visual analogue scale from 'Not free' (0) to 'Very free' (10) . Participants were instructed to give this rating according to their own interpretation of "free". A final screen also prompted them to indicate whether their decision had changed during the trial using a 'Yes' or 'No' response screen, on which the position of the response alternatives was counterbalanced to circumvent stereotypical and automated responding. This allowed us to determine the initial decision for each trial, given the combination of condition (displayed locks) and final selection. Each trial was separated by a fixation cross, jittered at 3, 5 or 7s to enable deconvolution of the haemodynamic response function (HRF). There were five functional runs of 24 trials, each with an equal number of pseudo-randomised Choice and No Choice trials. A brief questionnaire on the perception of the task conditions was administered at the end of the session once outside the scanner, asking participants to rate the subjective level of freedom of the different decision conditions and provide detail on their experience and any decision-making strategies.
fMRI acquisition MRI volumes of the whole brain were acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T scanner (Erlangen, Germany) using a standard 32-channel head coil. Functional images were acquired until the end of each block (depending on speed of task completion) using a gradient-echo echo-planar imaging sequence (GE-EPI) with simultaneous multi-slice acquisition (multi-band slice acceleration factor ¼ 4, 44 ). Five functional runs with approximately 600-700 vol were recorded, according to individual time to complete each trial. The first 12s of scans of each run were discarded to avoid magnetic saturation effects.
fMRI pre-processing All data was first pre-processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College London, London, UK). The images were spatially realigned using a six-parameter affine transformation to account for effects of participant movement. As MVPA was performed on the data, no further spatial normalisation or smoothing was applied at this stage. However, the T1 structural image was co-registered to the mean of the realigned functional images and then spatially normalised to MNI space using the segment process of SPM8 to obtain normalisation parameters for the MVPA accuracy maps.
Multi-voxel pattern analysis
MVPA was performed using custom scripts run in MATLAB (Bode et al., 2013) in conjunction with SPM8. A first-level general linear model (GLM) was first estimated for each individual participant based on motion corrected, non-normalised, unsmoothed data to produce parameter estimates for each voxel in each run and each condition. Beta images (condition x run þ six motion correction parameters per run) were estimated for each participant. Separate GLMs were run according to the type of decision category being examined. For the model of door choice, each trial was sorted by decision (Left or Right), separately for the two phases of the trial, resulting in two regressors for the trial start to halfway point and a second set of two regressors for the period between cue until the door choice (note that trial start and half-way point choices were not always for the same door, e.g. on switch trials, thus providing effective temporal jitter between consecutive Left and consecutive Right decisions in the GLM design). The model was the basis for a two-way classification analysis with chance accuracy ¼ 50%. A second model, to classify between Choice Stay and No Choice Stay conditions was designed to investigate patterns of activity associated with the availability of choice options when the actual behaviour (to stay with the initially chosen door) was identical. As this distinction was only meaningful for the second half of the trial, regressors were based on the period between halfway point and door selection. The model was the basis for a two-way classification analysis with chance accuracy ¼ 50%. As behavioural results showed that participants rarely freely chose to switch their door choice, no further models including Switch conditions were analysed. In all models, an additional regressor of-no-interest accounted for catch trials and errors and was not included in the following decoding analyses. Two participants exhibited a strong position bias for the left door (>70% trials), which provided insufficient data to train left and right choices, and were therefore excluded from MVPA.
A standard searchlight approach (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) based on the parameter estimates from each run (Bode et al., 2013; Haynes et al., 2007) was then applied to data from each individual participant separately. Pattern vectors for each condition were constructed from data extracted from a spherical cluster (3 voxel radius) centred in turn on each voxel in the brain. Next, a linear support vector machine classifier based on the LibSVM library (Chang and Lin, 2011) was trained on pattern vectors from the same cluster from all runs but one and tested on the remaining run. This analysis was cross-validated five times by independently repeating the training of the classifier on data from all combinations of four runs and using the data from each left-out run as the test data once. The average classification accuracy across these cross-validation steps from the respective cluster was assigned to its central voxel. This Fig. 1 . Experimental paradigm in the virtual environment for a single trial. At the start of each trial, the corridor with two doors at the end became visible and text appeared, asking participants to "Choose now" before they began to move up the corridor. At the halfway point, lock cues appeared, indicating whether one or both doors were available ("unlocked"). The position of the open locks corresponded to the position of the doors that were unlocked. Participants continued to the end of the corridor, where they selected either the left or right door. Every choice for an open door resulted in a star that was displayed after choosing the door. Participants then reported "How free" they felt their choice had been and, finally, indicated whether their choice had changed during the course of the trial. The trial shown gives an example of a No Choice Stay trial, where the participant initially chose the right door, and the halfway cue revealed that this door was available, but the left door was locked. Catch trials occurred periodically, represented by a stop sign cue appearing early in the trial, to ensure that participants actively made decisions at the beginning of each trial.
way, after running the analysis for all possible clusters in the brain, whole-brain classification accuracy maps for each individual were created separately for each of the classification analyses. To prepare the data for group-level statistical analyses, the individual classification accuracy maps were spatially normalised to the standard MNI template in SPM and smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The accuracy maps were then entered into a one-sample t-test to identify voxels where classification was significantly above chance. Statistical maps were reported for clusters !10, at a voxel-level threshold corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05 FWE-corrected). Finally, we also conducted univariate group analysis of GLM parameters for each of the models, using single-sample t-tests, to investigate whether any multivariate differences from the searchlight MVPA analysis could be explained by differences in overall activation level between conditions.
Behavioural and neural correlation analyses
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed on ratings of perceived freedom of choice for the factors Choice Availability (Choice or No Choice) and Choice Response (Stay or Switch). Significant interaction effects were followed with pairwise t-tests, Bonferronicorrected for multiple comparisons. In order to investigate relationships between the perceived freedom of choice ratings with decoding accuracy, we normalised participants' ratings using z-transformation. We then ran Pearson correlations between the peak classification accuracy in each significant cluster from the Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay classification analysis and normalised perceived freedom of choice ratings across participants. This analysis aimed to provide an indicator of whether the discriminability between neural patterns that related to the availability of choice alternatives would correspond to perceived freedom of choice. Finally, we calculated a Pearson correlation between the classification accuracy for the same analysis (Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) in the same clusters and the individual probability of Choice Switch trials to determine the relationship between neural representation of alternative options and the likelihood of participants to choose to switch.
Results
Behavioural performance and free choice ratings
Participants performed the task according to instructions, on average selecting the available door on 98.5% (SD ¼ 3.6%) of No Choice trials and responding in time to 96.7% (SD ¼ 4.5%) of the catch trials. Door selection was well balanced overall with a slight bias towards the left door, which was selected with the index finger, in both task trials (M ¼ 54.1%, SD ¼ 12.2%) and catch trials (M ¼ 53.6%, SD ¼ 16.3%). Of note, this included two participants who exhibited a strong bias of greater than 80%. Switches were reported on 47.8% (SD ¼ 6.2%) of No Choice trials, in line with the chance nature of selecting the same door as the pseudorandom task assignment. In Choice trials, participants on average only opted to switch doors on 17.3% (SD ¼ 22.1%) of the trials (Choice Switch). However, the proportion of Choice Switch trials greatly varied across participants (range 0-71.7%). Four participants never chose to switch, so free ratings were not available for their Choice Switch trials. In the post-session questionnaire, when asked on what basis participants judged how free their decisions were, participants indicated the ability to perform their own initial choice (17/24), the availability of options (10/24) and the feeling of the decision (4/24; Supplementary Data).
Average ratings of perceived freedom of choice differed across conditions (Fig. 2) 
Multi-voxel pattern analysis
First, we investigated from which brain regions we could predict participants' choices during each half of the corridor (Fig. 3) . During the period from the start of the trial to the halfway point, before the cues were presented, participants' intention to choose the left or right door could be decoded from a cluster in the visual cortex (p < 0.05 FWEcorrected), with an average decoding accuracy of 76% (26% above chance). Once the cues were visible, from the halfway point until the end of the corridor, decoding in the visual cortex remained significant, at an accuracy of 76% for Choice trials and 80% for No Choice trials. An additional cluster in the left motor cortex represented choice information at this stage at an accuracy of 70% for No Choice trials (p < 0.05 FWEcorrected); in Choice trials, this motor cortex cluster represented choices with 63% accuracy and was not significant at an FWE-corrected level (p < 0.001 uncorrected). Decoding in the left motor cortex is likely to reflect the mapping of chosen location to motor plans (the index and middle fingers of the right hand were always mapped onto the left and the right door position, respectively). At the same uncorrected threshold level (p < 0.001), an additional cluster in the precuneus was found to be predictive of choice outcomes with 59% accuracy in the Choice condition only. Univariate group analysis, using single-sample t-tests, showed significantly greater overall activation level in one cluster of left visual cortex for Left choices versus Right choices at the trial start (peak coordinates À26, À86, À8; peak z ¼ 4.15; cluster extent ¼ 153 voxels; P FWE < 0.05) and at the corridor mid-point (peak co-ordinates À14, À92, 2; peak z ¼ 5.40; cluster extent ¼ 811 voxels; P FWE < 0.05), and one cluster of right visual cortex for Right choices versis Left choices at the corridor mid-point (peak co-ordinates 14, -82, 12; peak z ¼ 4.73; cluster extent ¼ 156 voxels; P FWE < 0.05). There were no significant univariate differences in activation level in motor brain regions at either time point.
We next examined patterns of activity that allowed for the decoding of the availability of choice options for Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay conditions. In these conditions, participants engaged in the same choice behaviour and stayed with their original chosen door, with the only difference being whether or not the alternative door remained free to choose after the locks appeared. We reasoned that the distinguishing difference between the two conditions would therefore be the availability of an alternative option. We found that two clusters in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were predictive of the availability of an option, including right middle frontal gyrus (MFG; peak MNI coordinates [36 35 34]), with a decoding accuracy of 63%, extending to the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; peak MNI coordinates [21 32 -5]), with an accuracy of 57% (Fig. 4A); (p < 0.05 FWE-corrected) . Univariate group analysis showed no significant differences in overall activation level between these conditions anywhere in the brain (voxel-level and cluster-level P FWE > .05).
Next, we investigated whether the patterns of activity in the main right MFG cluster or the right IFG that were predictive for the ongoing availability of choice options were also related to the participants' subjective experience of free choice. We hypothesised that if patterns in these clusters represented the alternative door, more distinct patterns of activity would correspond to greater perceived freedom when both options were available in Choice trials, and conversely less perceived freedom in No Choice trials. We therefore correlated the average decoding accuracy from these clusters for each individual with their average free choice ratings for Choice Stay and No Choice Stay trials separately. In the right MFG, we found a significant positive correlation (r ¼ 0.61, p ¼ 0.002) between decoding accuracy and how free participants reported the Choice Stay trials to be (Fig. 4B) . We also found a significant negative correlation between decoding accuracy and the perceived freedom of choice in the Forced-Stay condition (r ¼ À0.49, p ¼ 0.02; Fig. 4C ). We found no correlation between decoding accuracy in the IFG and perceived freedom in either condition (r<0.01, ps>0.10). These results confirm that the discriminability of patterns in the MFG was related to both the perception of more freedom in the Choice condition as well as of less freedom in the No Choice condition.
Finally, we aimed to investigate whether greater encoding of the alternative door when it was available further corresponded to a higher likelihood that the participant would choose to freely switch doors overall. We correlated decoding accuracy in the MFG with the frequency of choice switches participants made. This Pearson correlation analysis revealed a positive significant relationship of r ¼ 0.43, p ¼ 0.04, indicating that participants with higher decoding accuracy in this region switched their choice more frequently (see Fig. 5 ).
Discussion
We sought to determine whether the availability of choice influences the perception of freedom and the neural representation of choice in voluntary decision-making. We found that participants' subjective experience of freedom was dependent on both the number of open locks at the half-way point, as well as whether participants were forced to switch to a different choice option or could stay with the initially chosen one. We interpret this finding as participants' subjective experience of freedom depending on the ongoing availability of options during decision preparation. Participants rated choices as significantly freer in cases where both doors remained available to select, in contrast to when only the same initially freely chosen option was still available. A likely interpretation of this scenario is that simply eliminating the availability of an alternative door reduced the perceived freedom, even though the participant's initial choice could still be made. Decoding the choice conditions in which participants freely stayed with their initial choice or were required to stay by the presence of a locked door revealed that availability of choice was represented in fine-grained patterns of activity in frontal regions in the MFG and IFG. The accuracy with which these conditions could be decoded from the MFG correlated with the perceived level of freedom individuals reported. We further found a positive correlation of decoding accuracy in the same region with the frequency with which participants freely switched when both doors were available. Together, this indicates that perceived freedom of choice may relate to neural activity encoding the available options in the environment.
In order to investigate subjective freedom of choice, we asked participants to report how free they felt for each decision without specifying how the participants were to judge freedom . Critically, the use of self-report allowed for a graded metric of free choice based on participants' own interpretations (Callard and Fitzgerald, 2014; . We found that participants' perceived freedom for their choices was significantly influenced by the availability of options. When the opportunity remained to select the other door, or change one's mind, participants rated their choices as significantly freer than when the other door was locked. A number of studies have indicated that people display a preference for having choice, even when it provides no additional benefit (Bown et al., 2003; Leotti and Delgado, 2011; Suzuki, 2000) . It is often thought that this preference is related to a sense of agency in being able to make a choice (Leotti et al., 2010; Ryan and Deci, 2006) . In our study, participants freely chose at the start of every trial but reported greater freedom for trials where both doors remained open than trials where they found the alternative, non-chosen, door was locked. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that our participants rarely chose to freely switch their decision, with some participants never choosing to do so. Therefore, our findings suggest that it is not simply making a choice but the ongoing availability of options that contributes to a sense of free choice.
With regards to the specific left or right decision, we found that the upcoming decision could be decoded from neural activity in the visual cortex from the start of the corridor in all conditions. Furthermore, univariate analysis showed that this significant MVPA decoding in the visual cortex was also associated with a significant difference in the overall level of activation within regions of the left and right visual cortex (although only significant from the trial half-way point in the right visual cortex). We suggest that this most likely reflects participants visually attending differently to the doors, based on spatial positions, depending on their door choice. Note that our study was not designed to further understand the exact nature of this representation. Following the lock cues, the left or right door choice could be decoded from the left motor cortex (although only significant at a corrected level for Choice conditions), suggesting differences in motor preparatory activity for the right index and middle fingers, to match the left or right door, respectively. Thus, it appears that participants may have relied on visual attention initially to for the upcoming choice, and only translated it into a specific motor plan once the options were known. We found evidence of less reliable decoding, particularly in the motor cortex, when both doors remained open. One could speculate that this reflects that participants continued to deliberate the choice when provided with options. This would be in line with previous studies that have shown that free choices are less strongly encoded in the brain than instructed choices (Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris and Haggard, 2014) .
We further found that the availability of choice could be decoded from regions in the right MFG and IFG when comparing only the conditions in which participants continued with their initial choice. It should be noted that participants had already formed their intention prior to seeing the cues, therefore other factors of the choice, including the maintenance of their initial intention and motor preparation, were equivalent; in both cases participants were able to select the door they had initially chosen. These regions are part of the DLPFC, which is involved in maintaining task-relevant information online, especially in the transmission of sensory information to prospective motor plans (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003) . Activation of the MFG, in a similar cluster to ours, has been previously associated with sustained visuospatial attention during tasks requiring object information to be held online for an upcoming response (Babiloni et al., 2005; Curtis et al., 2004; Ricciardi et al., 2006) . While this could be related to either spatial memory or prospective motor preparation, efforts to dissociate these effects have suggested that MFG activity is more specifically associated with spatial memory (Curtis et al., 2004) . In our task, participants were required to keep in mind the available doors to choose as they approached their position in the virtual environment. Thus, the availability of one or both doors could be expected to differentially recruit visuospatial information storage. This might have resulted in slightly enhanced signal strength in some voxels in MFG that could have been picked up by the classifier; it might also have resulted in different pattern of encoding, or a mixture of both. While our study was not designed to tease apart these possible explanations, it clearly shows that the change in available options was reflected in MFG activation patterns.
MFG activity has also been found to increase prior to freely made attentional shifts between left and right visual streams (Gmeindl et al., 2016) . This was proposed to reflect the intention to re-orient attention to the alternative option. There are notable parallels between this study and our current findings, where we could decode from the same region under conditions when a second option was available for consideration. Based on our previous findings of more visual fixations to alternative options for free than instructed decisions (Rens et al., submitted) , it is likely that participants attended more to the alternative door when it remained open than when it was locked. This is also in line with our finding of a correlation between decoding accuracy in this region and the likelihood that participants freely switched their choice. Even though the decoding accuracy was derived from conditions in which no switch occurred, one possible interpretation is that more distinct patterns of activity in this region reflected greater consideration of the alternative door and this, in turn, was linked to a higher probability of an ensuing decision to switch. Overall, our findings support the view that activity in this region corresponded to consideration of options in the environment in order to prepare an upcoming decision (Gmeindl et al., 2016) .
Remarkably, we further found that the difference in activity patterns in the MFG, corresponding to the availability of choice, was strongly correlated with the perceived freedom of choice individuals reported. Decoding accuracy in the MFG for each participant correlated positively with the perceived freedom of choice when both doors were available, and negatively with the perceived freedom for trials in which the alternative (non-chosen) door was locked. This suggests that individuals who had a more distinct neural representation of the availability of choice, and hence possibly greater consideration of the alternative door, were more likely to perceive their choices as being freer and, conversely, more likely to perceive the absence of options as less free, even when they were still able to select the door that they initially chose. Alternatively, these individuals could have had a higher propensity for perceiving freedom of choice, which may have led to more distinct neural representations of the presence of choice options. Freedom of choice has often been linked to the availability of options through self-report measures (Banja, 2015; Catania, 1975; Monroe and Malle, 2010 ), but we provide evidence that the subjective experience of free choice can be linked to neural representations of the availability of choice.
It has been suggested that subjective freedom of choice relates to the degree to which the environment precludes alternative options, rather than strictly to the degree of choice . We extend this to propose that perceived freedom may be experienced at an individual level according to how strongly individuals weigh the options available to them. Our interpretation aligns with that suggested by , whereby individuals maintain an internal model of available options in the environment and this contributes to a feeling of free choice. We expand on this theory by showing that the removal of an option, by a locked door, appeared to change the choice representation in a dynamic task setting, but to a different extent across individuals. Of note, in a previous study the reaction times for choosing between options appeared to reflect the initial number of options, rather than the final reduced set . However, our study provides evidence that a locked door resulted in an updated choice representation with a reduced level of freedom. The reason why we find evidence of an updated choice representation may be that participants in our study had longer to update (4s in comparison to up to 1.5s). Alternatively, the interactive nature of the task environment may have encouraged more flexible updating. These factors remain to be investigated with future studies.
An outstanding question is why having multiple options would harbour a sense of freedom, particularly in experimental settings such as these, where there is nothing to be gained from selecting either of the doors. Likewise, it is perplexing that humans and other animals will select or even pay for the opportunity for choice when it provides no benefit (Bown et al., 2003; Catania, 1975; Leotti and Delgado, 2011; Ono, 2000; Suzuki, 2000) . One theory for why choice is so highly valued is that it permits us to optimise our outcomes in dynamic environments, such as the real world, where having options available has an adaptive advantage (Klyubin et al., 2005; Pezzulo and Ognibene, 2012) . From an embodied perspective, the freedom of an agent strongly depends on the possibilities it perceives in the environment (Klyubin et al., 2005) . The availability of choice may not depend solely on the initial options but may be continuously monitored as individuals prepare for upcoming decisions. Encoding of multiple available plans would enable an individual to flexibly update responses to environmental events or switch motor plans even after an action has been selected Resulaj et al., 2009) . Even if we are set on one choice, there is liberty in knowing that alternative options are still there, "just in case".
We designed this study to ensure participants did not base their decisions on real or constructed differences in the value of the outcome, and that commitments to choices were on the basis of will, or personal ownership of the choice alone. We also needed to ensure that there was a sufficient number of trials per condition available for the analysis. This came with a limitation in that the choices had no consequence, and the participants therefore had no objective reason to be invested in whichever option they chose (Bode et al., 2014) . While this task feature was unavoidable, this nevertheless limits the ecological validity of the task design. This may be one reason why they rarely changed their minds when permitted. In order to be more ecological, the choices would need to have different outcomes to attain. However, the fact that participants perceived freedom so strongly based on not only the ability to stay with their initial choice but availability of options, which was further evident in differences in neural patterns of activity, indicates that this effect exists in the absence of value.
In summary, we found that availability of options is represented in patterns of neural activity and influences the perceived freedom of choice. Our results are in accordance with an embodied theory of volition, in which an agent's experience of free choice is dependent on the opportunities for alternate actions that they perceive in the environment. Importantly, our findings suggest that preference for choice is not only related to the initial options that allow an individual to self-initiate a preferred choice. Rather, the continued existence of options appears to foster a sense of freedom as individuals prepare for upcoming actions. Ultimately, the positive influence on perceived freedom that choice provides may exist to promote adaptive behaviour in the context of a dynamic world.
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Supplementary data
Question:
Scoring:
On what basis did you judge how free your decisions were? Initial choice
Availability of doors Feeling
If I was able to stick to my decision, it felt like a free decision; if this was supported by the other door being locked, my decision felt 'confirmed' and more rewarding, but less free because the other option was no longer available. If both doors were unlocked, sticking to the decision and changing the decision felt equally free to me, as my decision in that case felt less affected by external influences.
1
My feelings 1 On the unlocked doors, if both were unlocked, i felt more free 1 the extent i can have my own choice 1 i judged my decision by whether it matches my initial or not, it feels free when my initial decision was the unlocked one 1 based on is it my choice is wrong or right. 1 If both doors were unlocked I felt very free, regardless of if I changed or not. If one door was unlocked and it didn't match my choice I didn't feel free. If one door was unlocked and it matched my choice, I felt less free as time went on for some reason. 1 do not force me to change my mind to achieve something and I feel comfortable. 1 basically on my urge of the right door 1 If my initial decision aligned with the unlocked door I felt my decision was still free 1 I regarded a free decision to be one that matched my initial choice as I was not redirected against my wishes, however a decision where I could change my decision at the end of the corridor seemed to be more free.
If my original choice was the same as the unlocked door and if both doors were unlocked I considered the decision to be free. 1 1 Whether or not, after the fact, I felt as though I was being forced to alter my decision or not. If I was not forced to make a change I felt as though I was more free in my decision, particularly if both were unlocked allowing me to remain with my choice OR alter.
Whether it matches my initial choice and when both doors are unlocked 1 1 free to choose and change my decisions 1 1 based on the previous choices they gave Whether the door I initially wanted to choose was still unlocked 1 whether or not I need to change my decision to get to the unlocked door 1 When I came to the end if I could pick the door I chose at the start I chose it to be very free 1 Whether the door I initially chose was unlocked and whether I could change from my original decision 
